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Abstract
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ropean companies. Investment of a PE ﬁrm is not viewed unambiguously. First, it
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company. We attempt to resolve these two conﬂicting conjectures. We use the Bu-
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companies. Our major results can be summarized as follows. A ﬁnancially constraint
or risky company has lower chances to lure a PE ﬁrm to invest. On the one hand,
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1 Introduction
In many European, countries the importance of private equity (PE thereafter) has risen
in recent years. At the same time, domestic private equity/buy-out providers have come
under increased scrutiny of policy makers. For example in spring 2008 Germany has en-
acted the Risk Limitation Act in hope to prevent objectionable macro economic activities
of ﬁnancial investors without simultaneously impairing efﬁcient ﬁnancial and corporate
transactions. Similar activities have been initiated in other European countries. Despite
the fact that the German law concedes a trade-off between the beneﬁts and the costs of
PE investment, the fear of the public that PE investors behave as “locusts” once they have
entered a company is still at the center of the public debate. PE investors are often blamed
for focussing purely on wealth redistribution that is detrimental for the rest of the com-
pany’s stake holders. However, especially across countries but also at a regional level,
the empirical evidence that sheds light on the motives of PE investors to engage in a com-
pany is a broadly missing. This paper aims to contribute in this respect. By analyzing the
determinants of PE investment at a micro-level, we intend to address two conﬂicting con-
jectures about the motives of PE investors: (i) investing for the sake of poor rent-seeking
and (ii) investing because of prior identiﬁcation of chances to add value to the company.
Because the comprehensive ownership and ﬁnancial data are largely missing, par-
ticularly across countries, previous studies on the determinants of PE investment have
focused on mere qualitative analysis (e.g. Thompson and Wright, 1995) or have looked
only at particular aspects of the investment decision (e.g. Opler and Titman, 1993). More-
over, the analyses of activity of PE ﬁrms have been limited to the US market and listed
ﬁrms as target companies. In the latter case the signiﬁcant drivers for the investment are
often indirectly redesigned by means of an event study (e.g. Achleitner et al., 2008).
In this paper, we examine whether PE investment is motivated by the beneﬁts of relax-
ing ﬁnancial constraints and incentive realignment and whether PE ﬁrm is attracted by
possibilities of wealth redistribution. We do so by comparing the previous year charac-
teristics of ﬁrms that have received a PE shareholder with those that have not. Evidence
that PE shareholding is more common in ﬁrms with characteristics that indicate severe
ﬁnancial restrictions and/or a high potential for incentive realignment would support
the hypothesis that the investment has been motivated by possibility to create rather than
redistribute wealth. In addition, evidence that ﬁrms with a relatively high potential for
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redistribution are not the dominant targets of PE investors would suggest that concerns
about rent-seeking activities are overstated.
We are interested in a cross-country comparison because different features character-
ize the ﬁnancial systems and the capital markets of the countries within EU. UK usually
sets an example of an extensively market-based ﬁnancial system, while German economy
has a reputation of being mainly bank-based. Other EU members fall somewhere in be-
tween these two extremes. Thus, in 2005 the ratio of the stock market capitalization to
GDP is 1.26 for the UK and 0.43 for Germany, while for other countries such as France
and Hungary (the new EU member state) the ratio is equal 0.83 and 0.24, respectively.
The picture is less pronounced if we consider ratio of private credit by deposit money
banks to GDP. The indicator ranges from 1.6 for the UK and 1.23 for Germany to 0.96
for France and 0.47 for Hungary. The reason for paying attention to differences in the ﬁ-
nancial architecture is twofold. First, the ﬁnancial system may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
investment activity of the PE industry (Black and Gilson, 1998a). Second, in our econo-
metric setting the ﬁnancial environment is most likely to be an important control variable
for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.
We use the data from two sources. We build our ﬁrm-level data-set from the 2008
(November) edition of the Amadeus data base provided by Bureau Van Dijk. The data
base includes ownership history beginning in 2000. From this base, we retrieve ﬁnan-
cial ratios, ownership information and other ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables for companies in all
European countries for the years 2000 to 2008. The country-level data on the nature and
evolution of the ﬁnancial system is adopted from the World Bank Financial Structure
Database (Beck et al., 2000).1
Our ﬁndings suggest that the more ﬁnancially constrained and risky the company the
smaller is the probability of receiving PE investment. Additionally, we ﬁnd that growth
of the ﬁrm does not inﬂuence the decision of PE ﬁrm to invest. We show that PE ﬁrm
is more likely to invest if the company has more shareholder funds. Finally, our results
suggest that larger cash ﬂows decrease the likelihood of attracting a PE investor.
The paper unfolds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we brieﬂy review the literature and
sketch the evolution of the PE industry in Europe in last years and develop our hypothe-
1The ﬁnancial structure data were accessed at the http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/FinStructure_2007.xls.
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ses. Section 4 presents the empirical model and describes the data. The empirical results
and their discussion are provided in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
2 PE investments in Europe in recent years: the general
perspective
According to the commonly used broad deﬁnition in Europe, the activities of PE investors
range from complete buy-outs over minority stakes and expansion capital to start-up
and seed investments. Traditionally, the most active PE market in Europe in terms of
both fundraising and investing is the United Kingdom, followed by France and Germany
(EVCA, 2008). Within few years, buy-outs have become the most important segment in
the PE sector in Europe. The buy-out segment dominates in various countries, including
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland. Since 2003 more than three quarters of the fundraising of European PE-ﬁrms
were going to the European buy-out segment. The investment of these ﬁrms into buy-
outs increased from more than 60 in 2003 to nearly 80 percent in 2007 (EVCA, 2008). In
2007(ﬁrst half of 2008), international ﬁnancial investors completed 1479(637) European
buy-out deals worth 174(38) billion EUR (CMBOR, 2008).
Buying-out, a PE ﬁrm takes control of a company, turns it around, and is willing to sell
it or to ﬂoat its shares after several years. A considerable share of a buy-out price is tra-
ditionally debt ﬁnanced. The debt share in the total acquisition price generally ﬂuctuates
between 60 and 80 percent (Axelson et al., 2008). The equity capital for these acquisitions
is provided not only by the buy-out funds, but also by the future management of the
acquired companies, although to a substantially lesser extent. In the past the debt cap-
ital for European buy-outs generally came from banks and from institutional investors.
Upon completion of the acquisition, the different risk-bearing loan tranches are passed
on to the participating investors and, in some cases, also to the market. In 2008, due to
the ﬁnancial crisis and the downturn in the market for syndicated and securitized loans
there is a clear tendency towards downsizing of a deal, more speciﬁcally, the average deal
shrank to around 70 million EUR in 2008 compared to 118 million EUR during 2007, ac-
companied by decrease in leverage ratios (CMBOR, 2008). Anecdotal evidence suggests
also that increasing number of PE ﬁrms invest in minority stakes either to use the stake as
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a platform for acquiring majority stake in the future or to gain a seat on the board for the
purpose of increasing and exerting the inﬂuence on the target company’s business strat-
egy. So called acquisitions by buy-out companies amount to 106 transactions in the UK
and Central Europe (CMBOR, 2008). Because the median age of targeted companies in
out sample is 16 years we are set to scrutinize exactly the buy-out segment (whose targets
are typically mature ﬁrms) as this segment receives ever increased attention.
3 Determinants of PE investment−the hypotheses
The reasons for PE investors to acquire stakes in companies extend from the demand
of family owners or individuals for decreasing their cluster risk to realizing increased
earning opportunities by removing a poorly working corporate governance regime. In
this paper, we test seven hypotheses on the determinants of PE investment in European
countries.
Berle and Means brought up the issue of a separation of ownership from control al-
ready in 1932. They emphasized that dispersion of shareholding creates for each single
shareholder an incentive to free ride on the control intensity of company’s shareholders.
As a result no control occurs, and the management would pursue all kinds of personal
goals to the detriment of the shareholders (Manne, 1965; Williamson, 1967). In the line
of this argument active investors buying a share big enough to cover their control costs
and combine this deal with a considerable participation of the management in the own-
ership of the company would reinstate the unity of ownership and control. Dispersed
ownership signals the possibility for PE investors to gain high returns (Jensen, 1986). If,
however, there is already a powerful shareholder present, this signals to PE investors that
the potential for value adding is low. Thus, we test
Hypothesis 1 the higher the stake of the non-PE largest shareholder the lower is the likelihood of
a PE-investor.
The ability of PE funds to raise a great deal of debt capital for the acquisition of a
target company, in addition to equity capital, has had a strong inﬂuence on promoting
the negative image of ﬁnancial investors in many European countries. However, the debt
ratio plays a signiﬁcant part in corporate management. Jensen (1986) describes high debt
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ratio as a carrot and stick strategy. On the one hand, it permits a high concentration of
the share holding and a fairly high participation by the management, which guarantees
high performance incentives. On the other hand, the high debt and the inherent threat of
rapidly losing their position because of the narrow distance to default is like a hard sanc-
tion mechanism. In this sense companies that are highly capitalized indicate slack and a
low level of automatically working management control. In addition, highly capitalized
companies leave room for savings on corporate taxes. In years with a sufﬁcient low risk
premia on loan ﬁnancing , the leverage effect would guarantee an immediate increase of
the shareholder return by reorganization of the capital structure (see e.g. The Economist,
2006). The notion of debt as a controlling device and a mean or realizing higher tax sav-
ings and shareholder returns leads us to
Hypothesis 2 if the ratio of equity to total assets increases the likelihood of a PE investment goes
up.
Williamson (1967) and Jensen (1986) consider excess cash ﬂow (free cash ﬂow) as com-
plementary to high capitalization, and as a further indication of a company’s weak cor-
porate governance. Given little debt service, the management enjoys large discretion
in spending money on unproﬁtable projects (see also Opler et al. (1999) and Lehn and
Poulsen, 1989). PE investor targeting such company may recognize the potential of stop-
ping such practice of wasting company’s resources by restructuring the companies ﬁ-
nancing and by initiating a business model that generates more proﬁtable growth.
However, the common public perception of PE investments in mature ﬁrms is differ-
ent. The targeting of “cash cows” is ascribed to the fact that the generated liquidity can
be used either to buy back shares on the market or pay dividends to shareholders. Both
would allow a quick amortization and a high return to the PE investment. Either of these
conjectures gives rise to
Hypothesis 3 the higher the cashﬂow of the company the higher is the likelihood of receiving a
PE investment.
Small companies, companiesthatare owned privatelyand/or byfamilies, are often re-
garded as being opaque and nontransparent for a potential lender or shareholder. Asym-
metric information between companies and investors and moral hazard lead to rationing
bylenders(e.g. Bester, 1985)or bythe capital market, ifthe company islisted in anilliquid
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stock market segment (see Wright et al., 2006). Off-the capital market equity capital may
ease the level of ﬁnancial constraints. Additional equity injection may improve the capital
structure of these ﬁrms. The observed close relationship of PE ﬁrms, in particular buy-out
specialists, with the banking sector may enable PE investors to activate additional debt
capital. Therefore we test whether
Hypothesis 4 more constraint company is likelier to attract a PE investor.
Almeida et al. (2004) argue that constrained ﬁrms save high cash out of cash ﬂows to
be insured against shortage of liquidity if positive net present values have to be funded.
They ﬁnd that US-ﬁrms that are located in the lower quartile of the size distribution in-
deed accumulate liquidity while larger ﬁrms refrain from doing so. Baum et al. (2008)
show that European ﬁrms in the lower quantiles of the size distribution also stockpile
cash out of cash ﬂow. In addition, they ﬁnd that the magnitude of the stockpiling de-
pends on the country’s ﬁnancial structure and the development. Our measure of being
ﬁnancially constraint is based on (see Almeida et al., 2004).
Akin to the situation of being ﬁnancially constraint, the risky companies are quite
unlikely to raise debt capital from the capital market (The Economist, 2009a). We measure
the risk by company’s probability of default (PD) and since bank is not going to grant a
credit to a company once it crosses certain PD threshold, the only way this risky company
can obtain capital is from institutional investor(s). We believe that PE ﬁrms could just be
such type of investor. PE investors have also gained a reputation of being specialists to
turn around a company (e.g. Thompson and Wright, 1995). Both implies
Hypothesis 5 a higher-risk company has more chances to lure PE investor entry.
Fast growing companies are becoming a powerful magnet for PE investment due to
potential to satisfy PE’s ﬁnancial interest. However such target companies are not always
fond of being bought-out because apparently the control over company will be diluted
and the prospects for the future might get grim when high growth disappears. We are
now however care about what drives PE ﬁrm to invest, therefore we anticipate
Hypothesis 6 the higher the growth rate of cash ﬂows the higher is the likelihood of attracting a
PE investor.
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Black and Gilson (1998b) suggest that a bank-centered ﬁnancial system is unable to
develop an effective PE industry since its underdeveloped stock markets fail to deliver
an efﬁcient exit channel. However, this supply side-driven conclusion may not hold from
the point of view of the demand side. Equity capital enables companies to insure them-
selves against liquidity and income risks. This ﬁnancing mode is also a “door-opener”
for debt capital. With low signiﬁcance of capital markets in a country’s ﬁnancial system,
off-market investment ﬁnancing is becoming more and more important since possibly
existing equity capital gap could be closed using such type of ﬁnancing. PE funds are
one of the few available sources for off-market equity capital. Thus, given that PE capital
outside of the stock-market could in theory at least partly compensate for a lack of public
equity capital, we suggest
Hypothesis 7 the lower the market capitalization the higher is the likelihood of an PE investment
in such an environment.
4 Methodology and data
Shareholder history The data comes from Amadeus Database (Bureau van Dijk.) The
Amadeus base contains a historical data of shareholders, which runs back to 2000. The
base enables to identify the type of the shareholder, though the classiﬁcation of the PE
investment is tricky. We made sure that we really deal with the PE, by inquiring and
choosing the appropriate NACE code of the investor and by comparing the names to the
established list of the PE ﬁrms.2 We have generated a dummy variable ‘d_P’ equal to 1 if
at least one PE investor is among the shareholder in a particular year. Variable ‘d_P_d’ is
then the difference of ‘d_P’ in two subsequent years. Accordingly, that ‘d_P_d’ is equal
to one, implies that the PE investor entered in this year. Among total of 104,052 cases,
the data reveals 3,797 PE entries (3.65 percent). The way the dependent variable is con-
structed precludes a secondary buy-out (Strömberg, 2007).3 We only look at the cases
when underlying variables suited for the analysis are available. Thus, of approximately
250,000 cases available in the data base, the sample reduces to 104,052 observations ﬁt for
2A subscription was acquired at http://www.privateequityinfo.com.
3A secondary buy-out implies that one PE ﬁrm acquiresthe company from another PE ﬁrm. Our ‘d_P_d’
variable indicates that in period t a company has at least one PE investor and that in period t −1 PE ﬁrm(s)
was(were) not among company’s shareholders.
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the regression analysis. Table 1 presents the frequency of the variable ‘d_P_d’ by years.
We observe increasing tendency in PE investment up to year 2007 and an abrupt plummet
in 2008. Table 1 seems to mirror the aggregate market development in the recent months.
The sharp devaluation of mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligation
beginning in the midst of 2007 immediately infected other markets for asset backed secu-
rities. Banks are now stockpiling syndicated loans given to PE ﬁrms in earlier deals since
the securitization and distribution to the capital market is not feasible. Leveraged ﬁnanc-
ing of PE deals has dried up as inventories of PE loans for earlier deals have grown in the
banks’ books and risk aversion of credit institutions reached new heights. A deepening
ﬁnancial crisis resulted in a sharp decline of PE investments (e.g. The Economist, 2009b).
PE in the form of venture capital is said to enter young ﬁrms while buy-out investors
primarily target older ﬁrms. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the age4 of ﬁrm at the
moment of PE entrance. The mean and the median are 28 and 16 years respectively.
These numbers indicate quite a large share of mature ﬁrms.
Table 2 gives frequencies of the PE entries by countries. United Kingdom, France,
and Spain received the most of the PE investments, although Ireland and Switzerland
have the largest portions of PE entries. Other signiﬁcant recipients of PE investments are
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Sweden. Norway has the largest number of observations but
lags in terms of attracting PE investors: the share is only 0.43 percent.
4The age of a company is deﬁned as a difference between year of the observed PE entry and year of
company’s incorporation.
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Figure 1: Distribution of age of ﬁrms that received PE investment
Speciﬁcation The aim of the study is to investigate which micro characteristics of the
ﬁrm in previous period attract PE investment in the current period. We thus make use of
the basic binary choice model, the logistic regression.5 As in many empirical applications,
we write logit as




where X is a vector of explanatory variables for ﬁrm i and a and b’s are parameters to be
estimated. We are primarily interested in regression coefﬁcients. Before presenting our
results, let us turn brieﬂy to description of the vector of explanatory covariates, X.
Explanatory variables To test our hypotheses we generate the following variables.
‘Majority Ownership’ is equal to one if one of the shareholders has either majority of
whole ownership, and zero otherwise. ‘Financial constraint’ variable is constructed along
the lines of Almeida et al. (2004). More speciﬁcally, ‘Financial Constraint’ is equal to one
if ﬁrm’s total assets are below the value of the 30th percentile of distribution of the total
asset, and zero otherwise. ‘Debt’ is a continuous variable representing shareholder funds.
We normalize ‘Debt,’ and ‘Cash Flow’ by total assets to prevent size effects. ‘Cash Flow
Growth’ is merely a ratio of current to previous value of the Cash Flow. ‘Risk’ reﬂects rela-
5We have chosen logistic over probit model. Greene (2003) claims that “...it is difﬁcult to justify the
choice of one distribution or another on theoretical grounds.”
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Table 2: Frequency of PE Entry by countries
# Country N PE Entry PE Entry, %
1 Austria 126 9 7.14
2 Belgium 7,591 160 2.11
3 Bulgaria 1,089 1 0.09
4 Croatia 580 15 2.59
5 Czech Republic 375 9 2.4
6 Denmark 3,797 62 1.63
7 Estonia 202 6 2.97
8 Finland 1,077 51 4.74
9 France 13,353 783 5.86
10 Germany 4,565 290 6.35
11 Greece 1,947 53 2.72
12 Hungary 953 7 0.73
13 Iceland 16 0 0
14 Ireland 118 20 16.95
15 Italy 6,518 199 3.05
16 Latvia 12 0 0
17 Luxembourg 105 5 4.76
18 Netherlands 1,175 77 6.55
19 Norway 25,068 108 0.43
20 Poland 1,082 28 2.59
21 Portugal 1,405 39 2.78
22 Romania 1,021 22 2.15
23 Slovakia 58 1 1.72
24 Spain 12,888 397 3.08
25 Sweden 5,457 132 2.42
26 Switzerland 657 83 12.63
27 Ukraine 1,494 3 0.2
28 United Kingdom 11,323 1,237 10.92
Total 104,052 3,797 3.65
tive probability of default, that isthe defaultprobability of the ﬁrm divided byprobability
of default of peer group. To calculate the probability of default, Bureau van Dijk uses the
MORE rating,6 which is calculated using a unique model that references the company’s
ﬁnancial data to create an indication of the company’s ﬁnancial risk level. Furthermore,
Bureau van Dijk claims that the ratings are comparable across countries−two companies
6See http://www.modefinance.comfor details.
11Financial Systems, Efﬁciency and Stimulation of Sustainable Growth Working Paper FINESS.D.3.1
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Sd Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Majority Ownership 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
Financial Constraint 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1
Debt 0.32 0.73 −115 0.14 0.30 0.51 8.12
Cash Flow 0.08 0.27 −16.1 0.03 0.07 0.14 32.4
Risk 2.62 6.66 0.003 0.22 0.54 1.66 294
Cash Flow Growth 1.50 68.2 −5,702 0.58 1.02 1.46 10,415
Market Capitalization 0.83 0.36 0.03 0.57 0.83 1.02 3.03
from different countries with the same rating have the same creditworthiness. We also
include a macro variable ‘Market Capitalization’ variable normalized by real GDP, which
was accessed from World Bank web-cite dedicated to ﬁnancial structure of contries.7
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of variables for observations without missing
values. Itisclearthat‘Majority Ownership’ isone only4percentofcases, while26percent
of ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constraint. Although probability of default ranges form 0 to 1, it
ranges up to 294 when adjusted for peer probability of default. Such relative relationship
enables to control for risk heterogeneity of the group in which ﬁrm is operating. ‘Debt’
is quite dispersed, but distributed symmetrically as mean and median values are almost
the same. The range of ‘Cash Flow Growth’ variable is huge, but we decided to keep it
and reserve it for the robustness check it elimination of outliers would change our major
conclusions.
In our analysis, we lag (one year) all the explanatory variables, since we are interested
in investigating how last year ﬁrm-level characteristics inﬂuence receiving investment
from a PE ﬁrm in the current year.
5 Empirical results
In this section, we provide empirical evidence for our seven hypotheses by means of re-
gression analysis. We ﬁrst consider a model which uses all available observations. Table 4
7The latest version can be downloaded at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/
Resources/469232-1107449512766/FinStructure_2007.xls. The values for year 2008 are not
derived yet so we assume they are equal to those in 2007.
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Table 4: Logit estimation of PE investment determinants in European Companies. The
dependent variable is an entry of the PE investor, ‘d_P_d’. The associated t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
Model 14a Model 24b Model 34c Model 44d
Majority Ownership 0. 2269** 0. 0168 0. 0292 0. 0345
(2. 95) (0. 21) (0. 38) (0. 40)
Financial Constraint −0. 2354*** −0. 3276*** −0. 3232*** −0. 2141***
(−5. 72) (−7. 71) (−7. 71) (−4. 66)
Debt 0. 3768*** 0. 1439** 0. 1286** 0. 0576
(7. 09) (3. 07) (2. 83) (1. 45)
Cash Flow −0. 6086*** −0. 4927*** −0. 4489*** −0. 3025***
(−10. 05) (−7. 68) (−7. 35) (−4. 91)
Risk −0. 0099** −0. 0178*** −0. 0188*** −0. 0063
(−2. 64) (−4. 62) (−4. 92) (−1. 62)
Cash Flow Growth 0. 0001 0. 0001 0. 0001 −0. 00004
(0. 83) (0. 67) (0. 57) (−0. 13)
Market Capitalization 1. 0579*** 0. 7747*** 0. 8790*** 0. 8857***
(28. 94) (14. 84) (18. 26) (23. 32)
Constant −4. 2506*** −3. 5949*** −3. 7100*** −3. 4415***
(−90. 98) (−59. 75) (−66. 27) (−71. 85)
Pseudo R2 0. 03 0. 01 0. 02 0. 03
N 104,052 71,445 76,237 47,628
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% test levels, respectively;
4a All available observations included;
4b Only EU−15 countries are included;
4c Only EU−27 countries are included;
4d All available observations included less those that have at least one ﬁnancial investor.
presents results of the basic regression in the ﬁrst column under “Model 1” marker, Ta-
ble 5 provides marginal effects. We look at the extensions robustness checks then.
First, it is clearly seen that if in previous year a ﬁrm had been entirely owned or owned
by the majority, the PE investor is more likely to invest in such a ﬁrm. Therefore we accept
hypothesis 1. PE investor might consider that in case it wants to buy the majority stock it
is going to be easier to negotiate with only one owner than with dispersed shareholders.
Second, if a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained the likelihood that PE investor enters next
year is smaller. The way we constructed the ‘Financial Constraint’ variable, implies that
PE is cautious about smaller ﬁrms since they could be relatively young and less well
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Table5: Marginal effects afterlogit estimation ofPE investmentdeterminantsin European
Companies. The associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Model 15a Model 25b Model 35c Model 45d
Majority Ownership 0. 0080*** 0. 00075 0. 0012 0. 0019
(2. 69) (0. 21) (0. 37) (0. 39)
Financial Constraint −0. 0071*** −0. 014*** −0. 013*** −0. 011***
(−6. 04) (−8. 26) (−8. 24) (−4. 88)
Debt 0. 012*** 0. 0064*** 0. 0054*** 0. 0032
(7. 13) (3. 07) (2. 83) (1. 45)
Cash Flow −0. 019*** −0. 022*** −0. 019*** −0. 017***
(−10. 1) (−7. 70) (−7. 37) (−4. 91)
Risk −0. 00032*** −0. 00080*** −0. 00079*** −0. 00034
(−2. 64) (−4. 64) (−4. 94) (−1. 62)
Cash Flow Growth 4. 8e−06 5. 4e−06 4. 4e−06 −2. 0e−06
(0. 83) (0. 67) (0. 57) (−0. 13)
Market Capitalization 0. 034*** 0. 035*** 0. 037*** 0. 049***
(29. 9) (15. 2) (19. 0) (24. 2)
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% test levels, respectively;
5a All available observations included;
5b Only EU−15 countries are included;
5c Only EU−27 countries are included;
5d All available observations included less those that have at least one ﬁnancial investor.
known, which makes them more susceptible of capital market ﬂuctuations. Hypothesis 4
is thus, accepted.
Third, positive coefﬁcient at ‘Debt’ variable implies that PE investment is likelier the
larger the equity of the ﬁrm. It is a long-standing policy debate wether or nor PE investors
come to a ﬁrm in order to extract something valuable for own good. Our analysis seems
to provide empirical evidence to reject hypothesis 2 and indeed PE investors are attracted
by large equity of a ﬁrm.
Fourth, our regression analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis 3 that PE ﬁrm rather
comes to a ﬁrm with large cash ﬂow. This seems to contradict the wide-spread view that
PE ﬁrms enter to nourish themselves from cash-cows.
Fifth, according to our results, PE ﬁrm is rather reluctant to invest in risky company,
which in turn does not support our hypothesis 5. Companies with large probability of
default are very unlikely to be granted a loan at the bank, so they turn to ﬁnancial in-
vestors. If it is a young and promising enterprise it will mostly probably ﬁnds a PE (such
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as a venture capital) investor. Our results however can not conﬁrm this conjecture and it
is not surprising given the age of ﬁrms that receive PE investment (recall Figure 1).
Sixth, although it is reasonable to expect that the high growth ﬁrm in terms of cash
ﬂow is capital hungry and thus would attract a PE investor, our analysis does not support
this hypothesis. The regression implies that PE ﬁrm makes its decision to invest in a
company irrespective of this company’s growth of cash ﬂow. We can neither accept nor
reject hypothesis 6.
Finally, PE investors seek to invest in countries whose relative capitalization is bigger.
Although this macro variable is used mostly as a control for unobserved heterogeneity of
countries, larger capitalization implies better conditions and/or availability of ﬁnancing
for a PE ﬁrm. We broadly accept the hypothesis 7.
5.1 Robustness check
It is reasonable to believe that some observations are inﬂuential and might drive all the
results. Additionally, quite different ﬁnancial and economical system might prevent some
factors to reveal their true effect. Indeed quick look at the Table 6 suggests that the sample
of all less original EU−15 countries comprises mostly economies unable to attract PE
investment. Exceptions are naturally, those developed countries that do not belong to the
Union, Switzerland and Norway.
Economically, original EU−15 countries might be assumed to be more or less homo-
geneous and performing analysis on solely this sample can therefore reveal some features
that were disclosed when all 28 countries are pooled together. We reduce the entire sam-
ple by 32,324 observations (mostly due to case of Norway), but we increase the number
of PE entries in the sample in relative terms from 3.91 to 5.17 percent. The results of this
exercise can be found in the second column of the Tables 4 and 5 under marker ‘Model 2.’
Discarding the changes in magnitudes of the coefﬁcients, but taking only signiﬁcance
into account, the results suggest that major conclusions on tested hypotheses found for
the entire sample hold for EU−15 countries except for the hypothesis 1. More speciﬁcally,
in the sample of EU−15 countries, when making investment decision, PE ﬁrms do not
take into consideration if majority or whole ownership characterizes a target company.
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Table 6: Frequency of PE Entry by countries, all less EU−15
# Country N PE Entry PE Entry, %
1 Bulgaria 1,089 1 0.09
2 Croatia 580 15 2.59
3 Czech Republic 375 9 2.40
4 Estonia 202 6 2.97
5 Hungary 953 7 0.73
6 Iceland 16 0 0.00
7 Latvia 12 0 0.00
8 Norway 25,068 108 0.43
9 Poland 1,082 28 2.59
10 Romania 1,021 22 2.15
11 Slovakia 58 1 1.72
12 Switzerland 657 83 12.63
13 Ukraine 1,494 3 0.20
Total 32,324 283 0.88
The conclusion on rejecting or accepting of all other hypotheses still hold and are not
affected by employing different sample.
Thenwere-rantheregressions on asampleofthe enlargedEuropeancountries, EU−27.8
The results of this exercise appears in the third column of Tables 4 and 5. The coefﬁcients
of this regression are almost identical to those of regression on EU−15 countries despite
the sample increased by roughly ﬁve thousands. This implies that the difference between
two samples EU−15 and EU−27 countries does not alter the major conclusions. Unfor-
tunately, the sample of only eight countries is too small to run separate regression on
it.
Finally, one might think that presence of ﬁnancial investors (other than PE) might
inﬂuence the decision of PE ﬁrm to invest. Therefore for purity of the experiment, we
re-ran regression on the entire sample less those ﬁrms that have at least one ﬁnancial
investor. The results are presented in the last column of the Tables 4 and 5. By doing so,
the sample reduces more than in half, from 104 to 47 thousands. There two differences
to the results of the entire sample. First, that the target company has either majority or
whole owner stops to matter for PE when she chooses to invest. Thus we can neither
8This adds eight countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and
Slovakia. We do not have observations for Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia.
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reject nor accept the hypothesis 1. Second, probability of default does not determine the
decision of the PE ﬁrm to invest. The rest of the conclusions made for the entire sample,
hold for this sub-sample as well.
Although these checks have brought about some minor differences, we suggest that
the results of this paper are robust and leave it for the future to experiment with other
tests for robustness.
6 Concluding remarks
In the recent years the policy makers have become increasingly concerned with reconcil-
ing two contradicting views on the role of PE for the economy in general and companies
in which they invest in particular. First, it is conjectured that engagement of a PE in-
vestor may and does provide the ﬁnancing needed for development of the company, and
thus such engagement constitutes positive effect. Second, some share a view that PE in-
vestor enters the company, that has good perspectives, in order to squeeze company’s
cash resources and exploit company’s good standing, therefore implying negative effect.
However, to the best of our knowledge, testing these conceptually opposite hypotheses
with good quality data is broadly missing. This paper provides empirical evidence for
better understanding what makes PE ﬁrm invest using comprehensive micro-data for 28
European countries.
Our results suggest that before investing PE investor seem to care and is more willing
to invest if majority or whole shareholder is present. This conclusion is however not
robust to sampling variation. Additionally we ﬁnd that a ﬁnancially constrained and
risky company is less successful in attracting investment from a PE ﬁrm. Further, PE ﬁrm
does not care if the target company is fast growing or not. We also ﬁnd that while PE
ﬁrm is more interested in investing if the company that has more shareholder funds, it is
rather reluctant to invest in a company with large cash ﬂow.
In support of our conclusions we performed a battery of robustness checks, but still
one has to be cautious when evaluating the results. First, the purpose of our analysis
was a cross-country comparison and therefore we concluded for an ‘average’ European
company. Nevertheless, including the macro control variable into regression has shows
that countries are statistically signiﬁcantly heterogeneous and possibly separate conclu-
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sions have to be drawn for each country. This is however possible only for a handful of
countries due to data availability. Second, although we believe that our conclusions are
robust, we would like to acknowledge that some countries are really badly represented
and broad conclusions for such countries are separate regions might not necessarily hold.
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